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Abstract
The United States lacks a comprehensive strategy and supporting programs to support and 
defend the population of the United States during times of war and to mobilize, sustain and 
expand its defense industrial base while under attack from a peer or near- peer adversary. 
These legacy programs were disbanded and broken up over 25 years ago, and without a 
reinvestment in these activities by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), America risks losing its next great war. 
FEMA is currently responsible for advising the President on the coordination, mobilization, 
and sustainment of the U.S. industrial and manpower base in times of war, and to protect 
and assist in the recovery of its population from enemy attacks. Developing a framework 
based around Civil Defense, the mobilization and sustainment of the nation’s manpower 
and defense industrial base, protecting and sustaining its morale and political institutions, 
and support to the Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to deploy forces overseas while 
contested domestically by its adversaries, may provide a way to shape future preparedness 
efforts and a taxonomy to organize them. This nation’s failure to do so may end its next great 
war before it even begins.
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Introduction
The United States has not had a comprehensive strategy to protect its civilian population and 
defense industrial base, or to mobilize and sustain the nation during time of war, in almost 
25 years. Without an investment in these activities by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), America risks losing its next 
war with one or more major nation states. 
To understand how the nation reached this point, we need to examine how the Civil Defense 
and national mobilization programs were created in the wake of World War II. They bounced 
from agency to agency over a nearly thirty-year period before being consolidated with the 
creation of FEMA in 1979, though this article will focus its historical perspective mainly on 
the roots of Civil Defense as an example for both programs. From there, the terminal demise 
of both programs in 1993 can traced to the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of 
natural disaster relief as a national priority. Because of the sudden ending of both programs, 
the United States lacks continuity should it see the need to restart one or both programs in 
the face of current threats. This lack of continuity, however, may prove to be an opportunity 
for a fresh start in reimagining what they might look like in a new Civil Defense and national 
mobilization program, unburdened by past prejudices and legacy technologies.
War and National Defense, Emergency Preparedness, 50 U.S.C. § 3042 (1947)
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Part I How Did We Get Here?
Since its creation in 1979, FEMA had been responsible for coordinating, and in some cases, 
directing the civilian war effort for the United States. Most prominently, it had inherited 
the nation’s Civil Defense program that primarily focused on preparing the country for a 
nuclear war with the Soviet Union. However, the agency’s portfolio was much larger than 
simply marking shelters, preparing evacuation plans from urban areas, and coordinating the 
Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations (COG/COOP) plans for the federal 
government. It also was responsible for mobilizing and sustaining the nation’s industrial 
and manpower base, managing the prioritization and allocation of resources between the 
military and civilian sectors, and potentially advising the President on nationwide austerity 
measures. These capabilities and their associated funding, from the earliest days of the Civil 
Defense and national mobilization programs in the 1950s, were targeted by states for other 
purposes. State governors and emergency managers were far more interested in using 
these resources and funding to respond to natural disasters. Over time, the Civil Defense 
programs, and to a certain extent the mobilization programs, became more and more “dual 
It shall be the function of the [Administrator of FEMA] to advise the President concerning 
the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including— 
(1) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most 
effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation’s manpower in the event 
of war;
(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation’s natural and industrial 
resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the 
civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs 
and conditions;
(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies and departments 
engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation 
of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;
(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, 
manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;
(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for 
the conservation of these reserves;
(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, 
the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation’s security.
In performing his functions, the [Administrator of FEMA] shall utilize to the 
maximum extent the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of 
the Government. 1
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use,” and able to be used for both preparedness and response to either a nuclear war or a 
natural disaster. In 1992, the first FEMA director to have previously served as the head of a 
state emergency management agency entered into this longstanding contest for resources.
On November 28, 1993, the Director of FEMA, James Lee Witt, ended the country’s Civil 
Defense and national mobilization programs. When he took office in 1992, the former 
Director of the Arkansas Office of Emergency Services and confidant of President Bill Clinton, 
moved swiftly to reorient a FEMA reeling from its poor response to Hurricane Andrew. He 
inherited an agency heavily focused on its Cold War missions, with nearly half the agency 
devoted to supporting Civil Defense and other military-related responsibilities, and almost a 
third of its 2,746 full-time employees in classified positions. 2  With the experience of a career 
in state government, and in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, Witt would go on to 
reshape FEMA and its culture completely. He would dismantle its Civil Defense and national 
mobilization legacy while leaving a few unconnected parts to linger for years to come.
Witt made his intentions clear even before he arrived at FEMA. His reorganization plan 
entitled “The Renewal of the Federal Emergency Management Agency” failed to mention 
Civil Defense or mobilization even once in its 18 pages. His proposal subsumed the nation’s 
Civil Defense and mobilization programs into FEMA’s all-hazards mission, which had 
become synonymous with natural disasters. While parts were repurposed from some of 
their Cold War duties, such as accelerating the use of Mobile Emergency Response Support 
detachments for use in disaster relief, others, including whole offices, disappeared entirely.3 
The National Preparedness Directorate saw the biggest changes. The focus of its 1,019 
employees was  devoted primarily to Civil Defense and national mobilization. It included 
offices for mobilization preparedness, mobilization assessment and plans and authorities. 
Their organization was swept away completely, and was replaced with a Preparedness, 
Training and Exercises Directorate that emphasized “building capabilities and supporting 
state and local emergency management programs” through grants, doctrine, and training 
for natural disasters. It also became home to the Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
program, which deals with nuclear power plant emergencies and planning, and the Chemical 
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness program.
Witt’s plan would create the position of National Security Coordinator as a collateral 
duty to the Chief of the Special Projects Unit aligned in the Response and Recovery 
Directorate. In the capacity of National Security Coordinator, the individual will be 
responsible to the Director for ensuring FEMA’s national security requirements are 
fulfilled and representing the Director in national security policy matters. 4
Given the FEMA director’s well-known views, he had buried the last remnants of Civil Defense 
and mobilization within the bureaucracy of FEMA, but had made it a direct report to himself. 
Witt had driven a stake through the heart of these two programs and buried it in the sunlight 
of an office of one that reported directly to him. He had killed a vampire that had been sucking 
resources to prepare for a nuclear war that would be too horrible to ever recover from or 
would never happen. The long running conflict over the allocation of resources between Civil 
Defense, national mobilization, and the response to natural disasters was over.
Emphasizing the end of Civil Defense and national mobilization, two years later, Director 
Witt responded to a request from the National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake “to coordinate 
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a preliminary assessment of the national security emergency resource preparedness 
requirements set forth in Executive Orders 12656, 12919, 12148, 12742 and other related 
documents.” 5  Director Witt summarized the dismantling of these programs in a written 
memo responding to a proposed executive order relating to the Defense Production Act. 
As part of his response, he was asked about FEMA’s retreat from its role to coordinate the 
national security resources preparedness efforts. He stated FEMA had now dedicated 4.5 
permanent positions to fulfill its national security resources preparedness responsibilities 
and endorsed the findings of a series of interviews conducted across the government by 
senior FEMA officials, concluding that
The need for mobilization functions on a scale sufficient to support mobilization for a 
major conventional war has virtually vanished. The residual concern (i.e., belligerent 
and expansionist Russia or a militarily capable and belligerent China) is remote. 
Consequently, FEMA’s mobilization preparedness function should be made relevant 
in light of the post-Cold War environment. 6
Witt’s actions also removed FEMA from its role as the President’s coordinating agency for the 
fragments of the Civil Defense and national mobilization programs dispersed throughout 
the federal government, as required under Executive Order 12656. He also supported efforts 
that led to the termination of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, the bedrock authority 
for Civil Defense for over 40 years, and rolled out what was left of it into Title VI of the 
Stafford Act, where it has laid dormant for the most part ever since. The nation no longer 
had a government agency with the ability to coordinate and facilitate the dispersed activities 
of a Civil Defense program. For instance, the remaining legacy Civil Defense and national 
mobilization activities in FEMA are no longer formally coordinated with the activities of the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Commerce (DOC) to formulate and 
carry out plans for stockpiling strategic and critical materials for wartime needs. 
FEMA also lacks  formal ties with DOC’s Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology 
Evaluation (OTE) which conducts industrial base assessments to administer surveys and 
assessments of defense-related technologies, and monitors economic and trade issues 
vital to the U.S. industrial base. 7  Discussions have taken place between the two entities in 
recent years, but with no agency actively involved in enforcing the “dual use” of these legacy 
activities with disaster relief, the federal government has been unable to profit from the 
mutual interests of these agencies that remain stovepiped. For example, it is likely OTE’s work 
could provide support to FEMA’s efforts to assess key national supply chains, but without 
anyone responsible for coordinating these residual Civil Defense programs, the connection 
remains untapped.
The removal of any coordinating agency for Civil Defense and national mobilization also 
violated one of the key findings after Hurricane Andrew regarding the need to leverage Civil 
Defense resources for disaster relief. In the wake of FEMA’s disastrous experience, Congress 
directed the National Academy of Public Administration to take a comprehensive look at 
FEMA and decide whether it should remain a federal agency or be disbanded and replaced. 
One of that report’s findings was that the FEMA National Preparedness Directorate assets 
could have been of more use during Hurricane Andrew, but that they were not tied into the 
natural disaster response efforts found elsewhere in the agency. 
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Although the Directorate’s assets could have been instrumental in such tasks as planning, 
assessing damage, and establishing communications links between local, state, and federal 
officials at the disaster site, they were not fully employed to respond to Hurricane Andrew 
and other recent disasters. This response occurred, in part, because the Federal Response 
Plan in place at the time lacked procedures for using the Directorate’s assets to respond to 
natural disasters. 8
Today, the remnants of FEMA’s Civil Defense and mobilization programs are sprinkled 
throughout FEMA. It includes a division within the Office of Policy and Program Analysis 
(OPPA) managing FEMA’s delegated responsibilities to utilize the Defense Production Act 
(DPA) of 1950. 9  FEMA also maintains robust capabilities for coordinating public warning 
systems and COG/COOP consistent with the historical missions of Civil Defense during times 
of war. Its National Exercise Division and Response Directorate have planning and exercise 
functions that could still fall under “dual use,” and it also retains the legacy of its ten regions, 
eight of which originated with the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), with the final 
two created in the last years of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. However, none of it is 
connected as part of a larger holistic effort to support and defend the nation in time of war.
A Short History of Civil Defense
Civil Defense has its roots in World War I. As nervous Britons’ looked skyward, their 
enemies had finally managed to evade their fleet guarding their ancient and previously 
insurmountable moat, the English Channel. German airships, eventually joined by bombers, 
killed or wounded thousands. This new threat from above could not be met at sea, or by 
the British Expeditionary Force manning the trenches of Belgium and France. In response 
to these air attacks on its cities, Great Britain instituted what would become the first Civil 
Defense program. It focused primarily on more practical duties for civilians, such as fire 
suppression and other emergency services. 
The British experience during World War I was not lost on other nations. In 1916, The United 
States temporarily created the Council of National Defense, whose broad duties included 
“coordinating resources and industries for national defense” and “stimulating civilian 
morale.” 10  Between the wars, Great Britain, Japan, and Germany all created national Civil 
Defense programs. The United States watched from afar for the most part, but with the 
German invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939, it began to mobilize for war. One of the actions 
taken by President Roosevelt prior to entry into World War II was the creation of the Office 
of Emergency Management. 11  The “emergency” it referred to was not a natural disaster but 
rather the invasion of Poland and the start of World War II. It was not until early 1942, after 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, that natural disasters were added to the portfolio of “emergency 
management.”
The U.S. Civil Defense experience during World War II was quite different from that of its 
main ally, Great Britain, and its primary adversaries, Germany and Japan. All three nations 
suffered terribly from air attacks on their industrial and population centers. In response, 
they built Civil Defense programs to protect their civilian populations and industries from air 
attack. The United States, however, never found itself under significant threat. The Japanese 
could only muster their initial attack upon Pearl Harbor, a short occupation of a few far-flung 
Aleutian Islands, a minor submarine attack on a California oil refinery and the launch of a 
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number of incendiary balloons into the forests of the American Northwest. The Germans 
could do no better, as their only serious attempt at sending saboteurs ended quickly in 
amateur disaster, although their U-boats claimed scores of sinkings within sight of the 
American coastline.
In anticipation of America’s looming entry into the war, President Roosevelt created the 
Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in 1941. For a time, it was led by the energetic and former 
World War I era military pilot, New York City Mayor, Fiorello LaGuardia. Later, he would be 
joined by Eleanor Roosevelt. The two clashed repeatedly as Mayor LaGuardia looked to 
focus on more military-related activities, while Mrs. Roosevelt took a much more expanded 
view of Civil Defense. She looked to develop OCD programs to mitigate the dramatic social 
and demographic changes brought on by the migration of families throughout the United 
States to the locations of new war industries, and the entry into the workforce of women and 
minorities. Mrs. Roosevelt would eventually resign her position, as would Mayor LaGuardia, 
but their conflict showed that from its very beginnings, disagreement over the mission and 
limits of Civil Defense was apparent. Should it concentrate on activities in direct support of 
military defense activities and the mobilization and protection of the military industrial base, 
or should it be expanded to include the social and demographic issues of the civilians who 
were needed to carry on the war effort at home and to preserve their morale?
After the war ended, America quickly shed many of its wartime programs as it demobilized. 
Civil Defense, however, never quite faded away. While OCD was quickly wound down, Civil 
Defense and the protection of the American public during war remained on the periphery 
of the postwar reconstitution of the military establishment. Two major reports were issued 
on World War II Civil Defense as President Truman wrestled with the issue. The first, led by 
Major General Harold Bull, studied the wartime Civil Defense experiences of Great Britain, 
Germany, and Japan. The final report, released in February 1948, still resonates. Among its 
findings, it stated that Civil Defense was the “organization of the people to minimize the effects 
of enemy action” and that Civil Defense should be a civilian, not military responsibility.12 
Soon after, Russell Hopley was named as the Director of the newly formed Office of Civilian 
Defense Planning in the DOD. In November of that year, Hopley would issue his own report 
on what a comprehensive Civil Defense program should look like. Along with the passage of 
the Federal Civil Defense Act (FCDA) of 1950, 13  these two reports would form the basis for 
the Civil Defense establishment for the next 50 years.
The next 20 years largely inform the American public’s hazy recollections of Civil Defense. 
The Soviet Union became a nuclear power in 1949, and the Cold War began. Civil Defense 
alternately rose and declined in stature until President Nixon’s détente began a moderate 
thaw in relations. Depending on the political winds, responsibilities for Civil Defense would 
pass back and forth between the DOD and various civilian agencies that sprung up and then 
were subsumed by others during these years. The FCDA would give way to the Office of 
Defense and Civilian Mobilization, which would change its name to the Office of Civil Defense 
Mobilization. In 1961, it too was disbanded and its functions transferred to the Office of 
Emergency Planning in the Executive Office of the President, and the Office of Civil Defense 
in the DOD. Federal appropriations rarely exceeded $200 million per year, although the 
tensions of the early 1960s led to a one-time appropriation of almost $1 billion. Never again, 
however, would Civil Defense programs see anywhere near this much funding, and by the 
1970s, it had settled in at less than $200 million per year.
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The priorities of Civil Defense during the early Cold War era would also fluctuate. For instance, 
extensive planning was done for the evacuation of major American cities during the early 
1950s primarily due to the threat the United States faced from Soviet bombers armed with 
nuclear bombs. When ICBMs were developed, planning shifted in the 1960s to shelters; the 
remnants of that program can still be found scattered throughout the country. Already, the 
seeds were being sown to move Civil Defense capabilities slowly into “all-hazards” disaster 
relief. By the 1970s, the dual use of Civil Defense programs for natural disaster preparedness 
and response had come to the forefront, which culminated in a change to the FCDA in 1980 
that officially authorized the limited use of Civil Defense capabilities for natural disaster 
preparedness and response as part of an “Improved Civil Defense Program.” 14
The creation of FEMA in 1979 brought Civil Defense back together under one agency along its 
closely aligned national mobilization programs. Inheriting the responsibilities of the Defense 
Civil Preparedness Agency from the DOD, the GSA Federal Preparedness Agency, and the 
disaster relief authorities of the HUD Federal Disaster Assistance Agency, FEMA combined 
Civil Defense, national wartime mobilization and federal disaster relief into a single agency. 
However, it was the former two programs, not the latter, that retained the primary focus of 
FEMA until the arrival of Director Witt.
The Reagan Administration arrived at a new time of heightened tensions with the Soviet 
Union. As the Cold War intensified again, Civil Defense and national mobilization received 
significant attention within the government. New plans were begun as part of a Crisis 
Relocation Program to once again prepare for the evacuation of Americans from urban areas 
targeted by Soviet ICBMs to rural areas. When a series of mobilization exercises showed 
that plans to deploy American military forces to Europe were ineffective, FEMA created a 
Federal Master Mobilization Plan in conjunction with the DOD. 15  New intergovernmental 
processes to coordinate the preparation and response to a Soviet attack were developed 
and would eventually lead to the creation of the Federal Response Plan and its successor 
National Response Framework along with the development of emergency support functions. 
It even briefly crossed paths with then LtCol Oliver North, as the National Security Council 
participated in its national continuity of government exercises. This emphasis on Civil 
Defense and surviving nuclear Armageddon was emphasized in the 1986 mission statement 
of FEMA Director Julius Becton. “The mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
is one of critical importance to this nation. We have been entrusted with planning for the 
protection of our people and resources and the continuation of our constitutional form of 
government." 16
By the end of the Bush Administration, however, the Cold War emphasis of FEMA had finally 
run its course. With FEMA’s failure to respond adequately to Hurricane Andrew fresh in the 
minds of Congress, and then the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union marking the end 
of the Cold War, a new administration arrived in Washington under President Clinton. The 
time for Civil Defense and national mobilization had come to an end for the moment, as it 
was absorbed and forgotten under the mantra of “all-hazards.”
The Return of History 2017
With the dismantling of the Civil Defense and national mobilization programs, FEMA’s “all-
hazards” mission currently lacks an organized framework to address current threats of 
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a war against one or more nation states capable of sustained attacks against the United 
States. Unlike traditional natural threats, this scenario requires preparing and planning for 
the mobilization and sustainment of the nation’s manpower and defense industrial base. It 
will also mean the long-term commitment of FEMA’s response and recovery activities that 
may last for years and encompass catastrophic levels of damage inflicted repeatedly by this 
country’s adversaries. 
It is also quite possible that these nation states may avoid using nuclear weapons on the 
United States. Instead, they may use a combination of more traditional forms of combat, 
accompanied by asymmetric means, to attack the political will of the American public directly. 
For FEMA to meet these threats, it will need to expand its current all-hazards mission by 
building upon its forgotten authority, as previously acknowledged by the Latin inscription 
that appeared on its traditional emblem Pace Ac Bello Merita, “Service in Times of Peace and 
War.” Alternatively, FEMA could have its latent wartime authorities given to another agency, 
or returned to the DHS, from which many of those authorities are now technically delegated 
to FEMA. 
Buried Responsibilities
Through a series of dormant statutes, regulations, and executive orders, FEMA currently is 
responsible for (1) Advising the President on the coordination, mobilization, and sustainment 
of the United States industrial and manpower base in time of war, 17  and (2) Coordinating 
and conducting the nation’s Emergency Preparedness/Civil Defense program. 18  The 
purpose of the Emergency Preparedness/Civil Defense program is to deliver those activities 
and measures designed or undertaken to minimize the effects of a hazard upon the civilian 
population, to deal with the immediate emergency conditions that would be created by 
the hazard, and to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital 
utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by the hazard. 19  FEMA will also likely be asked to 
utilize its domestic consequence management authorities to assist the DOD in the contested 
deployment of forces overseas to conduct military operations in the face of opposition by 
one or more nation states. 20  FEMA’s ability to carry out these responsibilities  may be the 
key factor in determining the successful conclusion of such a war.
These legacy statutes, regulations and executive orders of past Civil Defense and national 
mobilization programs should best be thought of in terms not of the law per se, but as 
sources of the accumulated knowledge of past American generations that prepared for 
and fought against other peer nations. While dated and overtaken by the technologies and 
political trends of the 21st century, they nevertheless provide our best framework for current 
planners and policymakers to prepare a roadmap or at least describe what the nation may 
be asked to do if it ever again finds itself in a great war.
Despite the end of FEMA’s traditional Civil Defense and mobilization missions over 20 years 
ago, FEMA has  retained the legacy responsibilities to advise the President on the holistic 
support and defense of the civilian population and industrial base during times of war. These 
legacies remain in at least two statutes, two supporting executive orders, and a set of forgotten 
regulations. They represent the accumulated insight of past civil servants, administrations, 
and Congresses on what actions the nation must be prepared to take should it find itself in 
a war with one or more major nation states.
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These authorities include the aforementioned 50 U.S.C. §3042, Emergency Preparedness, as 
delegated to FEMA through DHS Delegation 9001.1. They also include Section 2 of Executive 
Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management which states that FEMA is the primary federal 
agency to coordinate all Civil Defense policies, planning, and management within the federal 
government subject to the oversight of the Secretary of Defense and the National Security 
Council. 21  These authorities include establishing federal policies for, and the coordination 
of, all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance 
functions of executive agencies. 22  A more thorough account of FEMA’s buried responsibilities 
can be found in Appendix A.
Part II CIVIL DEFENSE AND NATIONAL 
MOBILIZATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
No English Channel, nor Atlantic or Pacific 
Ocean to Protect
Historically, the United States generally has entered a war with a peer competitor or major 
nation state on its own terms or at a time of its choosing. None of its major conflicts have 
featured nation states that were ultimately capable of significant attacks upon the continental 
United States. 23  Much like this nation’s allies in Great Britain, protected for centuries by the 
British Navy patrolling the waters of the English Channel, the United States was separated 
from its great enemies by the vast distances of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Simply put, 
U.S. historical and current experience in war has not prepared the United States for a truly 
great war with an emerging peer adversary, or a major nation state that can utilize existing or 
developing means, both asymmetric and conventional, to strike the United States homeland 
directly. These attacks would disrupt the capability of the United States to project military 
force beyond North America, and would  disrupt or degrade seriously the ability of the United 
States to conduct a sustained and maximal war effort to defeat one or more nation states 
with significant weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities or the ability to conduct 
highly effective and sustained attacks on key national assets. 
The United States does, however, have historical examples of the necessary commitment of 
the U.S. civilian population and national morale, and its supporting industrial base, to win a 
war with one or more nation states, although none have the added dimension of doing so 
while under direct attack. The most notable examples are the United States’ experiences 
during the Civil War, World War II, and the Korean War. These examples show that close 
coordination must occur between the nation’s military efforts and its supporting civilian 
population and infrastructure. Some of these lessons from wars past exist in the dormant Civil 
Defense and mobilization responsibilities granted to FEMA. Others can be found elsewhere, 
such as two Army histories, one on the mobilization of the Army through 1945 and the other 
on the emergency operation of private industries by the Army in World War II. 24  However, 
since the last great national mobilizations in World War II and Korea, the United States has 
adopted a wholly offensive strategy to meet its enemies. This approach may no longer be 
possible given the threats and capabilities of the nation’s potential adversaries.
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Since the United States retreated from the Yalu River in late 1950, and forced a stalemate 
along the 38th Parallel, its armed forces have effectively been on the offensive for nearly 
70 years. While it has endured strategic quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan, and before that 
in Vietnam, the tactical, and certainly operational- level message to the American public 
has been to attack the enemy where they are, even if it ultimately proves strategically 
unsuccessful. In the movie Patton, George C. Scott, embracing the histrionics of his character 
shouts “L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace!” 25  Nothing more succinctly summarizes the 
modern American way of war. However, the United States no longer has the strategic luxury 
of relying solely on the offense. 
An historical allegory to America’s dependence on defense by committing its resources to 
the offense could be the story of the HMS Hood. As a British battlecruiser built just after the 
conclusion of World War I, the HMS Hood represented a series of compromises. 26  It carried 
the 15” guns of contemporary battleships, but could still exceed 30 knots, which made it 
one of the fastest capital ships in the world at that time. But those compromises nearly all 
favored its offensive capabilities at the expense of its ability to armor itself to defend from 
enemy shells.
Just minutes into its final battle, the HMS Hood was struck by a shell from the German 
battleship Bismarck that likely penetrated its aft ammunition magazine. Three minutes later, 
the Hood was gone. Only three of its crew of 1,421 would survive. Its World War I era design 
and tactics focusing on the offense made it just as vulnerable as its sister ships before it, 
which suffered terribly only two decades earlier. As stated in a blog post addressing the 
deaths of over 3,000 British sailors on battlecruisers during the Battle of the Jutland in 1916, 
“the British battlecruiser force lost over 3,000 sailors in one battle in large part because its 
offensive mindset blinded it to necessary defensive actions.” 27
Today, the United States risks recapitulating the fate of the HMS Hood. The American 
military, its congressional and civilian overseers, and the public historically, culturally, and 
dogmatically, embrace the offense. Except for a few short months in 1942, the mainland 
United States has never been at risk of serious conventional attack by another major nation 
state. The one risk to the U.S. homeland in its modern period, nuclear war with the Soviet 
Union, was so enormous in its size as to make the commitment of resources necessary to 
defend against such an attack politically unrealistic. Essentially, the threat was so huge that 
Americans over time simply grew to ignore it until it fizzled out at the end of the Cold War. 
Meanwhile, the nation slowly abandoned our ability to defend its citizens from direct attack 
and the capability to sustain a wartime mobilization, culminating with the ending of the Civil 
Defense and national mobilization programs in 1993. 
Potential Lines of Attack by an Enemy Nation 
State
The nation must be prepared to face a future war with one or more nation states with the 
capability to strike the U.S. homeland directly and repeatedly through attacks on its defense 
industrial and manpower base, the ability to contest the deployment of military capabilities 
beyond the United States, and the ability to attack U.S. political institutions. It is quite possible 
that the unsuccessful termination of such a war would be the result of the collapse of this 
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nation’s political will either through direct attacks on its population or the degradation of 
living standards, economy, and overall standard of living at great loss to the way of life which 
the United States has fought to protect since 1776.
America’s most potent potential adversaries, Russia and China, enjoy certain political 
advantages along with those of interior lines, space, and time during a potential war with the 
United States. As a democracy, America is particularly vulnerable at the start of a war with a 
peer adversary. General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff during World War II who would 
later serve as both Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, and the great “organizer of 
victory” offered his opinion on this topic by stating: 
A democracy has a very hard time in a war, particularly at the start of a war. They 
can never get ready in advance. The conditions are such that they are susceptible to 
surprise action, and an arbitrary government like the Hitler government has every 
advantage in those respects. They are just bound to win at the start unless they are 
very, very stupid. Of course, in the end, if the democracy is a firm democracy, it builds 
up a power which outlasts the other and the dictatorship bogs down. 28
Because of these advantages, it is quite possible a future adversary may never need to resort 
to the use of nuclear weapons in a war with the United States. Throughout the Cold War, and 
to the present day, a variety of reasons, including deterrence and occasionally good fortune, 
have prevented the use of nuclear weapons. 29  They remain exclusively for use by nation 
states. Proliferation to non-state actors could change this calculus, and a lesser adversary 
facing unsustainable losses, such as North Korea or Iran, might be tempted to use them to 
forestall defeat. 
These scenarios, however, do not constitute a sustained and existentially debilitating 
military campaign against the U.S. homeland. Those nation states that possess the means 
to destroy the United States, or to pose an existential threat to its national interests, are 
similarly vulnerable to strikes from the United States. Embarking on nuclear war has been 
recognized for decades as a zero-sum calculation. This scenario remains true even with the 
recent rhetoric surrounding North Korea. Notwithstanding North Korea’s attempts to build 
a nuclear arsenal, its leader has remained a rational actor in the eyes of the U.S. intelligence 
community. 30
For these reasons, while it is possible the United States may be struck by a nuclear weapon in 
the future, the likelihood of a full-scale nuclear war likely remains small. Politically, it is highly 
unlikely Congress will ever shed its aversion to funding a Civil Defense program that includes 
a massive sheltering, evacuation, and recovery effort. Even during the height of the Cold War 
in the 1960s, and its late resurgence in the Reagan era, the needle could not be moved on 
funding these programs. Thus, while any future Civil Defense program would clearly include 
planning for a nuclear strike against the United States, it may not be an efficient use of limited 
resources to conduct the comprehensive planning and exercise programs once dedicated to 
a major exchange of nuclear weapons.
The fact that nuclear weapons may never be used by a nation state against the United States 
does not remove the potential conflict of national interests between this country and some 
of its competitors. Instead, these conflicts may drive them to use alternative methods to 
Homeland Security Affairs | Volume 15 – Article 1 (May 2019) | WWW.HSAJ.ORG
13 H. Quinton Lucie How FEMA Could Lose America’s Next Great War
seek the successful conclusion of a potential war with the United States on terms favorable 
to themselves. Two of these alternate means could be to slow or prevent the deployment 
of U.S. military capabilities from the homeland or to use asymmetric means to attack the 
political institutions of the nation, thereby creating a domestic political climate amenable to 
agreeing to terms favorable to U.S. adversaries.
A potential strategy based upon these lines of attack might fit the following scenario 
employed by both Russia and China, or on lesser terms, by Iran and North Korea. First, 
they may seek to initiate a war by achieving a political objective through military means, 
such as seizing the Baltic States in the case of Russia, or for China, the invasion of Taiwan or 
otherwise enforcing military control over the South China Sea. Second, they would look to 
interfere with the deployment of U.S. military forces and capabilities from the continental 
United States. Third, they would seek to upset the mobilization and reconfiguration of the 
nation’s industrial and manpower base to wartime footing. Fourth, they would attack the 
American public directly through attacks on its electrical and financial sectors, the internet, 
and other critical infrastructure directly impacting the day-to-day lives of Americans and the 
nation’s economy. Fifth, through the effects of the aforementioned actions, and through 
the direct influence of the electorate through the “weaponization” of social media already 
demonstrated by Russia, 31  and potentially attacks directly targeting voting infrastructure, 
Russia and China would attempt to sway the executive and legislative branches of the federal 
government to end the war on terms favorable to them. 
While  Russia,  China,  Iran and  North Korea  are not democracies, a similar strategy might be 
employed against them. Instead of seeking to influence the U.S. electorate, the United States 
could focus on creating public unrest, the demoralization of conscript soldiers, or enticing 
the growth of alternative political power centers within their adversary’s governments who 
might agree to end a war on terms favorable to the United States. A U.S. victory under this 
scenario might follow the pattern seen at the end of World War I when the German Army 
eventually broke as the country grew tired of the war and forced the Kaiser into exile.
However, if the United States were to lose a war with another major nation state, it might 
result in a stalemate like the static armistice of the Korean War that allowed this nation’s 
adversary to retain its initial political and military gains. The United States would not suffer 
from the complete physical destruction and occupation, such as that seen by Japan and 
Germany in World War II. Instead of a Red Dawn military assault, it might be the failure of 
Congress to pass legislation to reinstate the draft, or to appropriate funds that would set 
in motion the events that lead to the negotiated end of a war on terms favorable to this 
country’s enemy. A myriad number of events could lead Congress, or the President, down 
this road at the behest of the American public without its enemies having to gain momentum 
on conventional battlefields.
A potentially successful strategy by an adversarial nation state might include, in echoes 
of the Vietnam War, minimal success in conventional battles. Instead, an approach that 
emphasizes disrupting the deployment of American military capabilities, inflicting great cost 
upon the American public to sustain the war, and disrupting the functioning of its political 
institutions, might be enough. Attacks upon critical transportation and power infrastructure, 
shutting down large portions of the national power grid for a sustained period, the use of 
social media to influence elections indirectly, and the hacking of electronic ballots to affect 
them directly, might, in combination, defeat the United States in a future conflict.
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Contested Deployment and Attacks Upon the 
Defense Industrial and Manpower Base 
In a future conflict with a nation state with the ability to conduct continued attacks upon the U.S. 
homeland, it is likely that those capabilities may be employed to delay or deny the projection 
of military forces overseas to carry the fight to U.S. adversaries. This “contested deployment” 
would mark a major change to the way the United States prepares and employs its military 
forces overseas. Attacks through direct and indirect means on critical infrastructure facilities, 
such as ports, interference with reserve and National Guard mobilization efforts, including 
communications, and targeted attacks on key personnel, such as the severe disruption of 
family financial accounts or threats to family members, may be expected. 
Nation states may attempt to carry out these attacks through a variety of means, such as 
cyber warfare to disrupt critical infrastructure directly supporting the deployment of military 
forces or small unit kinetic attacks on key industrial sites. An additional factor may also be 
the increase in the modern efficiency and lethality of the first strike capabilities of U.S. peer 
adversaries. These first strike capabilities may accentuate the importance of preparedness 
efforts as the failure to account for the effects of these capabilities may create sustained 
and long-lasting damage to the nation’s defense industrial base. As an historical example, 
the Japanese Navy failed to attack key infrastructure at Pearl Harbor in 1941, including fuel 
tanks and repair facilities. This failure meant the U.S. Navy did not need to relocate its Pacific 
Fleet to the West Coast and significantly add to its logistical burdens. In a future conflict, it is 
possible U.S. peer adversaries will not repeat that mistake.
Additional asymmetric measures, however, could also be executed. Using stolen privacy 
information, the enemy could ruin the financial lives of key military and industrial personnel. 
Fake deployment orders could be issued, and communications disrupted for activating 
National Guard and reserve troops through electronic and phone communications. Social 
media could be used to develop conscientious objectors, and diminish the morale of the 
American public to reduce its ability to rely on an all-volunteer military. All these means, 
when accompanied by a robust response to American military objectives, could potentially 
destabilize the ability of the United States to maintain a war against another nation state. The 
focus of all these courses of action is located within the U.S. homeland and would represent 
an unprecedented direct attack upon the country.
Attacking the Political Will of the American 
Public
The United States is a democracy and its decisions to make war and peace are ultimately 
decided by its elected representatives in Congress and by the President. Nowhere is this 
fact clearer than the presidential election of 1864. By the summer of 1864, the North was 
tired. Even Lincoln was pessimistic about his prospects for reelection, as he faced the former 
general of his armies, George McClellan. Some members of the Republican Party went so far 
as to make preparations to remove President Lincoln as their nominee. 32  While President 
Lincoln made it clear that peace could only come with the preservation of the Union and the 
abolition of slavery, McClellan adopted a platform that appeared to leave open the option 
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of the South to secede and retain its rancid and peculiar institution. 33  However, Lincoln’s 
political skills and a string of Union victories, headlined by Sherman’s capture of Atlanta, led 
to his reelection. This episode did expose how the decision to enter and continue a war by a 
democratic nation is ultimately found at the ballot box. Change the candidates, or the ballots 
themselves, and an adversary of the United States can win a war on its terms without the 
need for asserting control on the battlefield.
This observation is not new or unique. The American public has never been a monolith when 
it comes to supporting the nation at war. The Vietnam War consumed the presidency of 
Lyndon Johnson and the decision by President Bush to invade Iraq divided the nation. While 
the use of propaganda is probably as old as war itself, only recently have other nation states 
gained the tools to influence U.S. elections significantly, most notably Russia in the 2016 
presidential election. The CIA assessed that
Russian efforts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election represent the most 
recent expression of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal 
democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant escalation in 
directness, level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations.
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 
aimed at the U.S. presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith 
in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability 
and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government 
developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in 
these judgments. 34
 
More recently, current Secretary of State and former CIA Director Mike Pompeo, confirmed 
Russia’s continued efforts to interfere with U.S. elections and was prepared to take 
countermeasures to fend off its interference with the 2018 elections. 35  The secretary’s 
comments seemed to be confirmed as at least one Russian national was charged with trying 
to interfere with the November, 2018 elections. 36  And sometime in the weeks before, it 
appears President Trump signed an executive order that would make it possible to sanction 
foreign citizens suspected of interfering with U.S. elections and ordered the Director of 
National Intelligence to begin a 45-day review of the elections to determine whether there 
had been interference with disinformation campaigns or penetration of voting systems. 37
Foreign intervention and attacks upon U.S. political institutions for their own national interests 
is a bipartisan threat, although the results have partisan consequences. It is important to 
remember that a nation-state adversary is not wedded to any U.S. political party, but only 
to its own interests. The American people must be able to express their political will as free 
from outside influence as possible in times of war. The decision to pursue, continue, or 
abandon war should be made based on  this nation’s own interests, not those of its enemies.
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A New Approach to Civil Defense
A 21st century Civil Defense program must be prepared to meet old threats while recognizing 
the need to meet new ones. This new program must be prepared to support the Nation’s 
efforts to fight a war on simultaneous fronts. These fronts include the location of one or 
more overseas contests between armies, the physical defense of the homeland, sustaining 
and expanding the domestic critical infrastructure supporting both military needs and the 
civilian economy, the defense of our political institutions from foreign interference, and the 
preservation of national morale. The government must be prepared to see these fronts 
under attack from combined efforts both conventional and asymmetric, and not assume 
future enemies will require the use of nuclear weapons to carry out these attacks.
A new Civil Defense program would combine mobilization, Civil Defense, and COG/COOP 
activities as a consolidated, whole-of-government Civil Defense program envisioned with the 
creation of FEMA in 1979. The threat of nuclear attacks upon the United States still exists, 
along with a renewed ability of potential adversaries to attack the United States directly 
through military strikes and sabotage. In addition, new forms of asymmetric warfare have 
developed since the termination of the Civil Defense program in 1993, including the use of 
the internet and social media to attack critical infrastructure and the American economy 
directly and to influence or even directly attack elections. This program would also seek 
to continue to maximize its dual-use nature, developing capabilities that could also be 
used for natural and man-made disasters not related to war. But the primary purpose of a 
revitalized Civil Defense program would be to support the Nation’s war time efforts and not 
as another division supporting catastrophic planning, though it should find numerous points 
of connection with the latter function. War is a hazard, and as far as the phrase “emergency 
management” exists in a federal context, it was the original hazard. Without a program in 
place for Civil Defense and national mobilization, the Nation will continue to lack a true all-
hazards capability.
The development of a sustained commitment to prepare FEMA or the DHS, in coordination 
with the National Security Council, the DOD, and other federal agencies, to carry out the 
responsibilities articulated in 50 U.S.C. §3042 and elsewhere, could be a key, and potentially 
the crucial factor, to winning a future war. Without it, the support of the American public and 
the domestic political framework necessary to execute the Nation’s wartime goals could fail, 
even as the United States moves to reassert its dominance on the conventional battlefield. 
The primary target of our adversaries would become the American public and its supporting 
political institutions in order to cut out the historical need to defeat the United States on 
conventional battlefields, draining America of blood and treasure through persistent wartime 
losses and secondary home-front sacrifices to support a continuing war effort.
This sustained commitment should not, however, seek to replicate the same Civil Defense 
and mobilization structures that grew out of World War II and Korea, and the response to the 
Soviet nuclear threat throughout the Cold War. Instead, it should take into account the new 
and evolving threats against the United States. It is suggested that the federal government 
focus on three major goals (elaborated upon below) while developing a framework to address 
its responsibilities in a war with one or more peer adversaries or major nation states. These 
responsibilities could remain with FEMA, or if a consensus determined otherwise, be moved 
to another federal agency. However, historically the DOD has divested or downgraded its 
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assumed Civil Defense responsibilities and moving significant Civil Defense authorities to it 
again is probably not likely. 38
Protection of the Civilian Population, Defense 
Industrial Base and Key Critical Infrastructure 
and Preservation of Government Functions
The first goal would be to revive and incorporate some of FEMA’s traditional Civil Defense 
missions, which still exist in some of its all-hazards preparedness and consequence 
management efforts. This focus would be on the protection of the American populace and 
critical infrastructure and responding to attacks upon them utilizing the current paradigm of 
protect, prevent, mitigate, respond, and recover. Lines of effort could include: (1) mitigation 
of the effects of attack on the civilian population and supporting a sustained response 
and recovery campaign in the face of repeated attacks, (2) the identification, preservation, 
recovery, and sustainment of critical infrastructure supporting the civilian population, 
the defense industrial and manpower base, and key economic output, (3) sustainment of 
a resilient national economy while under attack, (4) protection of political institutions by 
indirect and direct influence and attack, and (5) continued planning and execution of COG/
COOP activities.
Many of these efforts would be carried out using traditional partnerships between the federal 
government and state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector. An example 
could be found in using the existing model of FEMA’s use of crowdsourcing efforts and 
expanding them further into cyber-defense efforts. The FEMA-led Community Emergency 
Support Teams (CERT) could also serve as a basis to provide a national volunteer network for 
the defense and recovery from physical attacks upon the United States.
These lines of action could be incorporated into the current all-hazards structure through 
additions to the five national planning frameworks, including the National Response 
Framework, and adding annexes specifically to address the complexities and unique issues of 
wartime. Eventually, each of the five frameworks supporting federal interagency operational 
plans for prevention, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation could also incorporate 
wartime annexes. An additional line of action could be to understand the wartime needs 
of the United States better to help shape the DHS Secretary’s response to Executive Order 
13806, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and 
Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States. FEMA should also harmonize these efforts with 
its existing national warning and COG/COOP activities as they would exist in time of war. 
Support for Contested Deployment
The second goal would be to support the DOD efforts to deploy military capabilities while 
under attack. The DOD remains in the earliest stages of recognizing and preparing for 
these potential threats. 39  Lines of effort could include the preservation, recovery, and 
sustainment of critical infrastructure supporting the deployment of DOD personnel and 
resources, the preservation, recovery, and sustainment of critical infrastructure supporting 
key DOD facilities domestically, and the preservation, recovery, and sustainment of critical 
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infrastructure supporting DOD capabilities  engaged from the Continental United States 
in direct and asymmetric attacks upon the enemy and necessary for the defense of the 
homeland.
While this second goal would have much in common with the previous goal, it would have 
a more specific focus and rely on the DOD to identify its requirements. Major military 
installations can employ thousands of civilians, and most service members do not live 
on military bases. Attacks by an enemy on surrounding communities could deprive DOD 
facilities of the ability to function through the attrition of the DOD’s workforce, the strain on 
military family members, and the reduction of critical infrastructure providing key services, 
such as water and power. In addition, some domestic military facilities are used to engage in 
military operations directly. For instance, Air Force bases support strategic bombers and air 
defense activities, the remote piloting of drones operating overseas, or even military cyber 
facilities engaged in virtual combat. The loss or degradation of any of these facilities would 
have direct effects on the battlefield.
Mobilization and Sustainment of the Defense 
Industrial and Manpower Base
The third goal would be to be prepared to advise the President and the National Security Council 
on the mobilization and sustainment of the nation’s manpower and defense industrial base 
during times of war and to implement those actions as required. Lines of effort could include 
managing the expansion, continual reorientation and sustainment of the defense industrial 
base, expanding the eligible manpower base, preservation, expansion and sustainment of 
critical infrastructure supporting the defense industrial base, and maximizing and prioritizing 
the use of the civilian population to support war efforts through military service, defense 
industrial base labor, key civilian economic output, and the temporary operation of critical 
industries for the defense industrial base. Nascent efforts to revive planning for these issues 
within the federal government and the DOD also need to be coordinated as they develop. 
For instance, when the Commandant of the Eisenhower School at the National Defense 
University led a conference working group on industrial mobilization in June of 2018, no 
representatives from FEMA were notified despite the fact FEMA has substantial equities in 
the topics discussed. 40  This is another example of how connections between agencies have 
been severed over the years.  
As existing statutory and executive directives were reconstituted to carry out these goals, 
they could be captured in FEMA’s legacy Civil Defense regulations still found in 44 CFR Part 
334. These remaining regulations focusing on mobilization and post-attack considerations 
could be updated to reflect the new 21st century Civil Defense program run by FEMA or as 
otherwise transferred within the federal government.
Conclusion
As previously stated, the United States has not had a comprehensive strategy to protect its 
civilian population and defense industrial base, or to mobilize and sustain the nation during 
time of war for almost 25 years. Without an investment in these activities by FEMA and the 
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DHS, America risks losing its next war with one or more major nation states. The government 
must find a way to marry burgeoning efforts focused narrowly on what the DOD needs to fight 
a full scale war, with the broader strategic wartime requirements of its supporting political 
system and citizenry. 41  Unfortunately, efforts so far  may not have reflected the fact that it is 
the morale and purpose of the American people that will be the crucial factor to prosecuting 
any future great war. 42  It is the American public, and their supporting political system 
and critical infrastructure that could quite possibly be the focus of our enemy’s attacks if it 
decides to bypass the American military juggernaut and go directly after the citizens it serves 
to protect. The Federal Government and the Congress must recognize that fighting a great 
war will extend to the homeland and take more than just meeting the increased manpower, 
industrial, technological and logistical needs of the military.
Under its dormant authorities and responsibilities, FEMA currently is responsible for advising 
the President on the coordination, mobilization, and sustainment of the U.S. industrial and 
manpower base in times of war as delegated to it under 50 U.S.C. §3042 and Executive 
Orders 12656 and 13606. The agency is also responsible for coordinating and conducting 
the nation’s Emergency Preparedness/Civil Defense program as directed under Title VI of 
the Stafford Act and as delegated under Executive Orders 12148 and 12656. 43  FEMA will 
also likely be asked to utilize its domestic consequence management authorities to assist 
the DOD in the contested deployment of forces overseas to conduct military operations 
in the face of opposition by one or more peer adversaries. These responsibilities are not 
currently reflected in FEMA’s planning and preparedness efforts under its current all-hazards 
mission. Today, the federal government spends more effort on preparing for the impact 
of a future asteroid than on preparing for the domestic civilian responsibilities in a future 
war with one or more peer adversaries. 44  FEMA’s official fledgling planning efforts remain 
narrowly focused on consequence management efforts in the aftermath of a limited nuclear 
exchange. 45
The level of national preparedness for these responsibilities that currently belong to FEMA 
may be the key factor in determining the successful conclusion of a war against one or more 
peer adversaries or major nation-states that can conduct sustained attacks against the 
U.S. homeland. Developing a framework based around Civil Defense, the mobilization and 
sustainment of the Nation’s manpower and defense industrial base, and support to the DOD 
in its efforts to deploy forces overseas while contested domestically by its adversaries may 
provide a way to shape future preparedness efforts and a taxonomy to organize them. This 
nation’s failure to do so may end its next great war before it even begins.
Appendix A
Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 46  marked 
the culmination of whole of government planning for preparing for and responding to nuclear 
attacks and other catastrophes. Among its pertinent responsibilities, it states in Section 
104(c) “The Secretary of Homeland Security [FEMA Administrator] shall serve as an advisor 
to the National Security Council on issues of national security emergency preparedness, 
including mobilization preparedness, civil defense, continuity of government, technological 
disasters, and other issues, as appropriate.” 47  Section 1701(7) also states that the DHS 
Secretary [FEMA Administrator] shall “develop and coordinate with all appropriate agencies 
civil defense programs to enhance Federal, State, local, and private-sector capabilities for 
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national security emergency crisis management, population protection, and recovery in the 
event of an attack on the United States.” 48
Several years later, FEMA issued regulations to carry out its responsibilities under Executive 
Order 12656. They can still be found in a long unused subchapter on preparedness. Spanning 
from Part 300 on Disaster Preparedness Assistance to Part 334, Graduated Mobilization 
Response, they are a window into the very last days of the Civil Defense program. Of particular 
interest are the parts on the priority use of resources in an immediate post-attack period and 
the mobilization responsibilities found in Part 334 guiding the nation as it would prepare for 
a future war. Part 312 also includes the last regulatory definition for the term “Civil Defense.”
Executive Order 13603, National Defense Resources Preparedness, requires FEMA to carry 
out most of the DHS Secretary’s responsibilities for the utilization of the Defense Production 
Act (DPA). 49  This authority includes the responsibility for the FEMA administrator to “advise 
the President on issues of national defense resource preparedness” and act on the secretary’s 
behalf on numerous other issues related to the DPA and the defense industrial base. 
The FEMA administrator also retains the legacy authority of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 
1950, which was repealed and replaced by Title VI, Emergency Preparedness, of the Stafford 
Act. 50  Unlike the rest of the Stafford Act, Congress has given the authority to carry out Title VI 
to the FEMA administrator and not the President or DHS secretary. 51  This authority results 
because the original Federal Civil Defense Act contained two major sections, one for general 
preparedness and another for post-attack actions. The latter contained extraordinary 
authorities, only available upon a proclamation of a Civil Defense emergency by the President 
or resolution by Congress. As Senator Carl Vinson stated during hearings in December 1950 
when debating the proposed language of the Act, “I doubt whether you have ever seen 
language as broad as this. It makes a man a complete dictator. He can take over all the realty 
of the United States…. If it was administered according to the authority here, you could just 
run the whole country. Absolutely. Even the President hasn’t this authority.” 52
The extraordinary post-attack authorities once granted to the head of the FCDA, and 
eventually, the FEMA administrator, were not retained in Title VI of the Stafford Act. However, 
Title VI remains important to Civil Defense for at least two major reasons. First, its definition 
of “emergency preparedness” is the lineal descendent of the former definition of Civil 
Defense,53  Second, Title VI, along with 50 U.S.C §3042, are the two statutory pillars of the 
Nation’s Civil Defense program, although a national definition of Civil Defense currently no 
longer exists, the previous definition was replaced by “emergency preparedness.” 54  The 
responsibility to carry out these two laws belongs to FEMA, either through the direct actions 
of Congress or through the delegation of its traditional authorities back from the DHS.
There may also be a number of “hidden” authorities which FEMA is currently unaware it 
still holds. For instance, Executive Order 11051 established the responsibilities for the 
Office of Emergency Planning in 1961. 55  Responsibility for carrying out this executive order 
was passed to the General Services Administration in 1973 and included “[a]ll authority 
vested in the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness as of June 30, 1973, by 
Executive order, proclamation, or other directive issued by or on behalf of the President or 
otherwise…” 56  Executive Order 12148, issued in 1979, stated in paragraph 1-103 “[a]ll functions 
vested in the President that have been delegated or assigned to the Federal Preparedness 
Agency, General Services Administration, are transferred or reassigned to the Director of the 
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Federal Emergency Management Agency.” 57  These authorities included the policy, planning 
and overall federal coordination of Civil Defense. This includes the responsibility of the FEMA 
Administrator to be prepared to “plan for the organization and functioning of the Federal 
Government in an emergency, including provisions for the central direction of all emergency 
mobilization activities and the creation of such emergency agencies as may be required for 
the conduct of emergency activities including those within the normal jurisdiction of existing 
agencies.” 58  In addition, the FEMA Office of Chief Counsel must be ready to support the 
Administrator to “provide for the prompt exercise of Federal emergency authority through 
the advance preparation of such proposed legislation, executive orders, rules, regulations, 
and directives as would be necessary to put into effect operating programs appropriate to 
the emergency situation.” 59  The last time FEMA was probably prepared to carry out this 
responsibility was in 1983 when it provided a copy of draft legislation to Congress entitled 
the “Defense Resources Act.” 60
In addition to these authorities that are conferred upon FEMA, a number of other statutory 
responsibilities are related to Civil Defense and national mobilization for which FEMA would 
likely find itself responsible. For instance, under 50 U.S.C. §3816, Utilization of Industry, 
which is hidden within the Military Selective Service Act, Congress has granted the President 
the right “to take immediate possession of any plant, mine, or other facility… and to operate 
it” if under the terms of the law, the President has properly placed an order for articles or 
materials in the interest of national security and for the exclusive use of the armed forces or 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and given proper notice to Congress. 61  FEMA would 
almost certainly be asked to advise the President on any actions taken under this authority. 
FEMA also has its standing missions, as articulated by Congress in the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act, which encompass most, if not all, of the Civil Defense duties for 
which it is responsible. 62
Appendix B
FEMA’S Civil Defense Responsibilities Under 
Executive Order 12148
2-101. The Secretary of Homeland Security [as further delegated to the FEMA Administrator] 
shall establish Federal policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil emergency 
planning, management, mitigation, and assistance functions of Executive agencies.
2-102. The [FEMA Administrator] shall periodically review and evaluate the civil defense and 
civil emergency functions of the Executive agencies. In order to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of those functions, the [FEMA Administrator] shall recommend to the President 
alternative methods of providing Federal planning, management, mitigation, and assistance.
2-103. The [FEMA Administrator] shall be responsible for the coordination of efforts to 
promote dam safety, for the coordination of natural and nuclear disaster warning systems, 
and for the coordination of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences of major 
terrorist incidents.
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2-105. The [FEMA Administrator] shall provide an annual report to the President for 
subsequent transmittal to the Congress on the functions of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. The report shall assess the current overall state of effectiveness of 
Federal civil defense and civil emergency functions, organizations, resources, and systems 
and recommend measures to be taken to improve planning, management, assistance, and 
relief by all levels of government, the private sector, and volunteer organizations.
2-201. In executing the functions under this Order, the [FEMA Administrator] shall develop 
policies which provide that all civil defense and civil emergency functions, resources, 
and systems of Executive agencies are: (a) founded on the use of existing organizations, 
resources, and systems to the maximum extent practicable; (b) integrated effectively with 
organizations, resources, and programs of State and local governments, the private sector 
and volunteer organizations; and (c) developed, tested and utilized to prepare for, mitigate, 
respond to and recover from the effects on the population of all forms of emergencies.
2-202. Assignments of civil emergency functions shall, whenever possible, be based on 
extensions (under emergency conditions) of the regular missions of the Executive agencies.
2-203. For purposes of this Order, ‘‘civil emergency’’ means any accidental, natural, man-
caused, or wartime emergency or threat thereof, which causes or may cause substantial 
injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of property.
2-204. In order that civil defense planning continues to be fully compatible with the Nation’s 
overall strategic policy, and in order to maintain an effective link between strategic nuclear 
planning and nuclear attack preparedness planning, the development of civil defense policies 
and programs by the Secretary of Homeland Security shall be subject to oversight by the 
Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council.
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